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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 2000712-CA 
v. : 
DANNY HITTLE, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction entered on a plea of guilty to 
criminal non-support, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 
(Supp. 1998) (in Add. A). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001). 
STATExMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Has defendant established as a demonstrable reality that the trial court 
obviously violated rule 11 by failing to instruct him as to his speedy trial right and 
that, but for that violation, defendant would not have pled guilty? 
2. Has defendant established as a demonstrable reality that the trial court 
obviously violated rule 11 by failing to inform him that the court was not bound by 
sentencing recommendations offered by the parties and that but for that violation, 
defendant would not have pled guilty? 
3. Has defendant established as a demonstrable reality that the trial court 
obviously erred in determining that defendant's plea was voluntary and that but for 
that violation, defendant would not have pled guilty? 
The first three issues share a common standard of review. To establish plain error, 
an appellant must demonstrate three elements: (i) an error occurred; (ii) the error was 
obvious; and (iii) the error was harmful. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 
1993). If any one of these elements is missing, there is no plain error. Id. at 1209. 
4. Did defense counsel render ineffective assistance when, at the change of 
plea hearing, he requested clarification of defendant's repeated claim of duress? 
An issue of ineffective assistance, raised for the first time on appeal, is resolved as 
a matter of law. State v. Munson, 972 P.2d 418, 422 (Utah 1998); State v. Huggins, 920 
P.2d 1195, 1198 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 929 P.2d 350 (Utah 1996).1 
'Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea below based on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel (R. 62-64; R. 140:1-3). However, the tnal court denied 
the motion, and defendant did not renew that particular claim on appeal, but instead 
presents a new claim (R. 110; R. 140:1-3). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, is relevant to the issues on appeal and 
is attached in Add. B. 
STATEiMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with two counts of criminal non-support: a third degree 
felony and a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (Supp. 
1998) (R. 44-46). On April 20, 1000, he entered a guilty plea to the misdemeanor charge 
pursuant to a plea bargain under which the State sought dismissal of the felony charge 
and agreed to a repayment schedule (R. 139:1-2) (in Add. C). At the time he entered his 
plea, defendant executed a written statement that he understood the rights he was 
waiving. That statement was quoted from and incorporated into the record at the change 
of plea hearing (R. 139:21-22).2 Defendant waived the time for sentencing, and the court 
sentenced him according to the parties' agreement: a term of 365 days in jail, suspended, 
and a specific payment schedule including on-going child support, arrearage child 
support, and attorney fees (R. 58; R. 139:22-28). In addition, defendant was to seek full-
time employment and take anger management classes through Valley Mental Health (id.). 
Defendant timely sought to withdraw the plea, arguing only that his trial counsel 
pressured him into taking the plea and citing an altercation which occurred in court 
:The entire transcript of the change of plea hearing is attached hereto as 
Addendum C. 
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following acceptance of the plea (R. 62-64; R. 140:1-3).3 The tnal court denied the 
motion (R. 110: R. 140:1-3). 
A vear later, on April 20, 2001, the tnal court found that defendant had violated 
numerous terms and conditions of his probation, revoked probation and reinstated the 
original sentence of jail confinement (R. 194-96). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Under a validly-entered divorce decree, defendant was required to pay $275.00 per 
month child support for his daughter, who was born on December 30, 1990 (R. 45-46; R. 
139:12)/ Between February 1, 1997, and April 5, 2000, defendant was chronically 
delinquent in payment of his child support, and his total arrearage at the time of 
sentencing was in excess of $10,000.00 (R. 45). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: Defendant's claim that the tnal court committed plain error in the 
taking of his plea by failing to mention defendant's right to a "speedy" tnal fails because 
the case on which he bases his entire argument is distinguishable from the instant matter. 
Further, defendant fails to allege any prejudice arising from the alleged error. 
Accordingly, this plain error claim is mentless. 
;The tnal court briefly mentioned the incident in denying the motion, but no 
transcnpt of the incident itself appears in the appellate record (R. 140:1-3). 
4The facts are taken from the prosecutor's recitation at the change of plea hearing 
and the amended information (R. 44-46; R. 139:12). 
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POINT II: Defendant's claim of plain error based on the tnal court's alleged 
failure to explain that it was not bound by the parties' sentencing recommendations fails 
because 1) he makes a wholly insufficient allegation of prejudice, and 2) the tnal court in 
fact informed defendant of the range of penalties which might attach to his guilty plea. 
POINT III: Defendant's claim that the tnal court plainly erred in finding his 
guilty plea to be voluntary is without ment as he fails to establish either obvious error or 
prejudice The tnal court made a thorough inquiry into defendant's statements of duress 
and properly distinguished the duress and its source from the voluntanness of this plea 
Further, defendant makes no showing of the requisite prejudice. 
POINT IV: Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance based on his counsel's 
request that defendant explain to the court the "duress" he felt fails because defendant 
does not establish an actual conflict of interest, a breach of the duty of loyalty, or 
deficient performance. Before defense counsel made his request, defendant had already 
bnefly established the nature of his duress claim, and the court properly acknowledged 
that the duress was removed from these proceedings. Defense counsel's subsequent 
request for further explanation from defendant was reasonable strategy in this case in 
light of the tnal court's expression of concern on the point and prevented the injection of 
invited error into the record. Further, nothing in the record suggests that the impact of the 
challenged explanation—reinforcing the tnal court's determination that the duress did not 
render the plea involuntary—would have changed had the explanation been reserved for a 
5 
subsequent challenge to the voluntariness of the plea. Accordingly, defense counsel's 
conduct was neither contrary to defendant's best interests nor deficient under the facts at 
hand. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT COMMITTED OBVIOUS OR PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
WHEN IT FAILED TO DESCRIBE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO 
TRIAL AS A RIGHT TO A "SPEEDY" TRIAL 
Defendant claims that the trial judge violated rule 11 in the taking of his guilty 
plea because the judge failed to inform defendant of his right to a "speedy" trial during 
the plea colloquy. Br. of Aplt. at 6-8. 
Under rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial court may not accept a 
plea of guilty before making certain findings, most of which involve the defendant's 
having been advised of his constitutional rights. Add. B. Thus, "fcthe trial court [must] 
personally establish that the defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary and 
establish on the record that the defendant knowingly waived his or her constitutional 
rights.'" State v. Visser. 2000 UT 88, f 11, 22 P.3d 1242 (quoting State v. Abevta. 852 
P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993)). The Utah Supreme Court has "described this duty as one of 
'strict' compliance." Id (quoting State v. Thurman. 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996)). 
"Strict compliance, however, does not mandate a particular script or rote recitation of the 
rights listed." Id (citing Abeyta, 852 P.2d at 996; State v. Maeuire. 830 P.2d 216, 218 
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(Utah 1991)). On the contrary, "the substantive goal of rule 11 is to ensure that 
defendants know of their rights and thereby understand the basic consequences of their 
decision to plead guilty. That goal should not be overshadowed or undermined by 
formahstic ritual." Id. 
Rule 11 compliance may occur through multiple means, including the use of a 
written affidavit of the defendant which is properly incorporated into the record during 
the plea colloquy. See State v. Ostler. 2000 UT App 28, fflf 17, 18, 996 P 2d 1065, affd 
2001 UT68, 31 P.3d 528: State v. Penman. 964 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Utah App. 1998). 
Because defendant failed to preserve this and his remaining challenges to his guilty 
plea, he relies on the plain error doctrine. Br. of Aplt. at 1-2, 7-8. To establish plain 
error, an appellant must demonstrate three elements: (l) an error occurred; (n) the error 
was obvious; and (in) the error was harmful. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 
1993). If any one of these elements is missing, there is no plain error. Id. at 1209. 
A. Defendant Fails to Establish Obvious Error in the Court's Failure to Utilize 
the Term "Speedy" 
Rule 11(e)(3) provides that the court may not accept a plea until the court has 
found that "the defendant knows of. . . the right to a speedy public trial before an 
impartial jury . . . ."D Add. B. 
"Defendant's claim does not encompass the words "public" or "impartial." See Br 
of Aplt. at 6-8. 
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As a threshold matter, this Court could dispose of defendant's claim by 
distinguishing the case upon which his entire argument is based, State v Tarnawiecki, 
2000 UT App 186, 5 P 3d 1222 The claims of error in each case are sufficiently 
different to prevent Tarnawiecki from controlling this issue. Tarnawiecki involved a 
claim that counsel "wholly failed to advise defendant of her constitutional right to a 
speedy trial before an impartial jury." 2000 UT App 186, f 11. Defendant in this case 
argues only that the trial court failed to utter the word "speedy " See Br of Aplt at 6-8 
Defendant does not claim that he did not know about his right to a speedy trial, and he 
does not claim that his counsel failed to explain that right to him. Id. at 8. Defendant 
makes no other argument to establish that the trial court's failure to use the word 
"speedy" in the plea colloquy prevented him from knowing his rights or understanding 
the basic consequences of his guilty plea. See Visser, 2000 UT 88, ^  11 (the substantive 
goal of rule 11, which is "to ensure that defendants know of their rights and thereby 
understand the basic consequences of their decision to plead guilty[,] . . should not be 
overshadowed or undermined by formahstic ritual"). Consequently, he has not 
established that the absence of the word "speedy" constitutes obvious error, and his claim 
fails. 
B. Defendant has Failed to Demonstrate That But for the Alleged Rule 11 
Violation, He Would not have Pled Guiltv 
More importantly, defendant has failed to make the necessary showing of harm 
under the plain error doctnne Plain error requires an appellant demonstrate that the error 
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was harmful. Dunn. 850 P 2d at 1208. While noncompliance with rule 11 may establish 
error and, in some cases, even obvious error, it does not necessarily establish prejudice 
See Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, *f 15 ("[I]t is difficult to see how the court's failure 
in this case to discuss the possibility that defendant may serve no time and incur no fine 
[as required by rule 11(e)(5)] would result in a harmfiil error").6 
Plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel share a "common standard" of 
prejudice. State v Litherland, 2000 UT 76, n.14, 12 P.3d92 (citing State v Verde. 770 
P 2d 116, 124 n.15 (Utah 1989); State v Brooks. 868 P 2d 818, 822 (Utah App. 1994), 
State v Elhfntz. 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App. 1992)). A defendant claiming that his 
guilty plea resulted from counsel's ineffectiveness must show "'a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted 
on going to trial.'" Parsons v Barnes, 871 P 2d 516, 525 (Utah) (quoting Hill v 
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)), cert, denied. 513 U.S. 966 (1994). Thus, a defendant 
6
 A "voluntary and knowing" guilty plea does not require strict compliance with 
rule 11 to be constitutionally sound under either the federal or state constitution. See 
Salazarv Warden. 852 P.2d 988, 991-92 (Utah 1993) "Rule 11 is a device for 
protecting the right [of voluntanness] but the scope of Rule 11 does not equal the more 
limited scope of the constitutional right." Id, at 992 (quotation and citation omitted). 
Instead, compliance with rule 11 merely "creates a presumption that the plea was 
voluntarily entered." State v Gambhn. 2000 UT 44, «| 11, 1 P 3d 1108. And while the 
"substantive goal of rule 11 is to ensure that defendants know of their rights and therebv 
understand the basic consequences of their decision to plead guilty," that goal "should not 
be overshadowed or undermined by formahstic ritual." Visser, 2000 UT 88, <| 11. 
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attempting to show plain error under rule 11 must demonstrate that but for the tnal court's 
omissions, he would not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted on going to tnal. 
In other words, where a defendant claims plain error in the taking of his plea, the 
test for prejudice is driven not by the requirements of rule 11, but by traditional plain 
error analysis.8 
A similar rule is followed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit. Rule 1 l's federal counterpart includes a subsection (h) entitled "Harmless 
Error." Fed. R. Cnm. P. 11(h). That subsection provides, "Any variance from the 
procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial rights shall be 
disregarded." This provision "rejects the extreme sanction of automatic reversal." 
Advisory Committee Note (1983 amendment). Thus, a rule 11 violation "warrants 
reversal only if it had a significant influence on appellant's decision to plead guilty." 
United States v. Vaughn. 7 F.3d 1533, 1535 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v 
Barry. 895 F.2d 702, 704 (10th Cir.), cert, denied. 496 U.S. 939 (1990)), cert, denied. 
" Otherwise stated, defendant must establish that an obvious error so infected the 
plea-taking that the appellate court no longer has confidence in its underlying validity, 
because the plea was less than knowing and voluntary. Cf. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09; 
also Visser, 2000 UT 88, ff 11-14. 
8The court of appeals strayed from this analysis in Tamawiecki by presuming 
prejudice, i.e., that failure to advise Tamawiecki of her right to a speedy tnal before an 
impartial jury "is prejudicial and therefore harmful." Tamawiecki, 2000 UT App 186, «| 
18. Tamawiecki should have been required to demonstrate that, but for the tnal court's 
violations of rule 11, she would not have pled guilty. Otherwise, omission of the words 
"speedy" and "impartial," like the failure to advise Tamawiecki of her minimum possible 
sentence as required by rule 11(e)(5), would have been harmless. 
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51 1U S 1036 (1994) Otherwise stated, the reviewing court will "'examine the facts and 
circumstances of the case to see if the district court's flawed compliance with 
Rule 11 may reasonably be viewed as having been a material factor affecting 
[defendant's decision to plead guilty.'" United States v Gigot. 147 F 3d 1193, 1198 
(lOthCir 1998) (quoting United States v Johnson. 1 F 3d 296. 302 f5th Cir 1993)(en 
banc) (in turn quoting United States v Bachvnskv. 934 F.2d 1349, 1360 (5th Cir ) (en 
banc), cert, denied. 502 U S. 951 (1991)). 
Although our rule 11 contains no harmless error provision, our plain error analysis 
does See Dunn, 850 P 2d at 1208. The Tenth Circuit's formulation is thus a useful guide 
to the application of harmless error analysis in the rule 11 context. To show that a rule 11 
violation was harmful, a defendant must demonstrate that the errors significantly 
influenced or materially affected his decision to plead guilty. This is another way of 
saying that, but for the errors, he would not have pled guilty. 
Defendant's claim of plain error fails because it is entirely missing the third 
element of prejudice. Defendant makes absolutely no assertion that the alleged error "is 
prejudicial " Br of Aplt. at 7-8. Accordingly, his claim should be rejected See Dunn, 
850 P 2d at 1209 (the absence of any one of the three elements of the plain error doctrine 
defeats the claim); State v Tennev. 913 P 2d 750, 756 (Utah App. 1996) (holding 
defendant's "brief, conclusory statement" insufficient to establish the prejudice required 
under the plain error doctrine). 
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Further, defendant's reference to Tarnawiecki does not cure the deficiency. Br. of 
Aplt. at 8. Not only was the analysis used in Tarnawiecki for this point in error, see 
footnote 8, supra, but the harmfulness of the error was not articulated in that case, 
rendering it insufficient to meet defendant's burden of establishing in this case the 
requisite prejudice. Defendant makes no attempt to even speculate as to resulting 
prejudice, let alone establish prejudice as a "demonstrable reality." Fernandez v. Cook, 
870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993). Further, he made no record in the trial court of why he 
decided to plead guilty and how the court's omission materially affected that decision. 
Neither did he claim below or on appeal that he would have gone to trial instead of 
pleading guilty had he only known he was entitled to a speedy trial. He failed to even 
mention this claim in his motion to withdraw his plea below. Thus, this record contains 
no showing of prejudice, defeating defendant's plain error claim. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ADEQUATELY INFORMED DEFENDANT 
THAT ENTRY OF HIS PLEA SUBJECTED HIM TO A SPECIFIC 
RANGE OF PUNISHMENT; MOREOVER, DEFENDANT FAILS TO 
ADEQUATELY PLEAD OR PROVE PREJUDICE IN THE TRIAL 
COURT'S EXPLANATION OF HIS POTENTIAL SENTENCE 
Defendant claims that the trial court violated rule 11 and committed plain error 
when it allegedly failed to explain to him before accepting his guilty plea that the court 
was not bound by the sentencing recommendations which might be made by the parties. 
Br. of Aplt. at 9-10. 
12 
A, Defendant's Failure to Adequately Plead or Prove the Requisite Prejudice 
Defeats His Claim of Plain Error 
As with Point I, defendant fails to allege prejudice to support his plain error claim 
Nowhere does he claim that had he been properly informed of the lower court's ability to 
reject the parties' sentencing recommendations, he would have proceeded to trial. 
See Point IB, supra. Neither did he mention this claim of error in his motion to withdraw 
the plea below, suggesting that any error was not plain either to him or to his counsel. 
Accordingly, his claim fails. 
Further, defendant's mere mention of prejudice is insufficient, consisting as it does 
of the bald assertion that the alleged error "is prejudicial." Br of Aplt. at 10. Such an 
assertion is insufficient to support the harmfiilness requirement of the plain error doctnne 
Tenney, 913 P 2d at 756 (holding defendant's "brief, conclusory statement" insufficient 
to establish the prejudice required under the plain error doctnne). 
Moreover, defendant received the sentence recommended by both parties under the 
plea agreement, rendenng the claimed error harmless. The parties agreed that the 
sentencing recommendation would be the payment of back child support under certain 
conditions, imposition and suspension of a one year jail sentence, and thirty-six months 
probation (R. 139*1-3). See Br. of Aplt. at 3. That was the sentence ultimately imposed 
by the lower court (R. 58; R. 139:23-25). Consequently, even assuming that the tnal 
court failed to explain to defendant that it was not bound by the sentencing 
13 
recommendations made by the parties, the error was harmless as those recommendations 
were in fact adopted by the court 
B. No Error Exists as the Record Establishes the Trial Court's Compliance with 
Rule 11 
Contrary to defendant's claim, it was made clear at the change of plea heanng that 
defendant knew the extent of the sentence to which he would be subject should his guilty 
plea be accepted. First, defense counsel represented to the court that he had already 
reviewed with defendant the consequences of entenng the guilty plea, "including that the 
Court could impose up to 365 days in jail and impose a fine of $2500 to which an 85 
percent surcharge could be added." (R. 139:1) (emphasis added). Second, dunng the 
plea colloquy, the following exchange occurred: 
THE COURT: Okay. And you understand as [defense counsel] has explained, that 
you could be facing a maximum sentence of up to a year in jail and fines including 
a surcharge of over $4600? 
[DEFENDANT]: I understand that. 
(R 139 5). Thereafter, at the same heanng, the lower court imposed the sentence 
recommended by the parties. The imposition of sentence appears in the record without 
any comment from defendant other than to clanfy to whom he should make his payments 
(R. 139-23-28). 
Accordingly, defendant was informed of the range of punishment applicable to his 
plea, and his plain error claim of a rule 11 violation is without ment. 
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POINT HI 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE ANY OBVIOUS ERROR OR 
PREJUDICE IN THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT HIS 
GUILTY PLEA WAS VOLUNTARY FOLLOWING THE COURTS 
THOROUGH REVIEW OF HIS CLAIMS OF DURESS 
Defendant claims the trial judge committed plain error "by accepting the plea of 
guilty after, on at least two occasions, Mr. Hittle stated he was entering the plea under 
duress." Br. of Aplt. at 10. He essentially contends, without support, that the mere 
mention of duress requires rejection of a guilty plea. However, he establishes neither 
obvious error nor prejudice on this record. 
A. Defendant Fails to Establish the Requisite Obvious Error 
Rule 11(e)(2) provides that "the court may not accept the plea until the court has 
found" that "the plea is voluntarily made .. .." Add. B. In this case, the court accepted 
the plea as being voluntarily entered after defendant twice mentioned that he felt he was 
under duress (R. 139:3, 6, 15-16). Defendant fails to acknowledge on appeal, however, 
that the trial court explored the basis of the duress claims, carefully considered 
defendant's explanations, and reasonably determined that, despite those claims, the plea 
was intelligently and voluntarily entered. That decision is fully supported by the appellate 
record. 
Defendant is technically correct that he twice stated during the change of plea 
hearing that he felt duress. Br. of Aplt. at 10. His first use of the word occurred at the 
beginning of the court's colloquy with him concerning entry of the plea. At this point, he 
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suggested that the duress stemmed from his frustration with what he perceived to be fraud 
by his ex-wife in getting the support amount established in the original divorce 
proceedings: 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Hittle, before I accept this proposed resolution, I 
want to review with you what matters that counsel has probably already covered 
with you but that are important for me to put on the record. You understand that -
well first of all, you understand this proposed resolution as a way of, the proposal 
as a way of dealing with this matter? 
MR. HITTLE: I understand it as being one of the ways of dealing with it, yes. 
THE COURT: More to the point, do you agree with this as a way of resolving this 
matter or do you wish to proceed to trial? 
MR. HITTLE: I've been placed under considerable duress but I'll agree to it. 
THE COURT: Well, you can either freely and voluntarily enter into this plea 
bargain or we can go to trial, but if there are continuing reservations or issues 
about this then - my duty is to establish that you are entering into this plea bargain 
from your own personal decision that this is in your best interest to proceed in light 
of all circumstances that you're facing. If you are not prepared to accept that or 
believe that that is the appropriate resolution then I, you know, I think counsel has 
already indicated to you that you can go forward with trial. So the question again 
is, in light of all the circumstances[,] do you agree with this as a resolution for 
handling this matter? 
MR. HITTLE: All the circumstances have not been brought forward vet at this 
point, one of which was fraud on mv ex-wife's part at the time of filing. 
THE COURT: That is a matter for a different setting. That's not the issue here. 
The issue here for me is, you are looking at an offer to plead to a Class A 
misdemeanor in exchange for dismissal of a third degree felony with an 
understanding of what the penalties can be on this Class A and either accepting the 
proposed resolution or not accepting it and proceed to trial on the felony and the 
Class A. Those are the issues. That is the sole issue before me. 
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(R 139 3-4) (emphasis added). The court then went on to explain the specific rights 
defendant would waive by entenng a guilty plea and to establish that he understood those 
rights (R. 139 4-5). It was during that exchange that defendant used the word "duress" a 
second time, again relating it to his ex-wife's alleged fraud and an inability to address the 
issue to this tnal court: 
THE COURT: Has there been any other offer, threat, or whatever offer given to 
you, made to you to get you to enter into this plea other than what has been said 
here in court? 
MR HITTLE* The thing that disturbs me. Judge, is the State refuses to consider 
that there was fraud involved. I understand I'm supposed to take that up 
elsewhere 
THE COURT Okay. But to get you to enter this plea, there have been no other 
offers, no other threats, nothing else given to you to get you to enter this plea9 
What I'm getting at is, this is something that you are choosing to do voluntarily9 
MR. HITTLE* I am doing it voluntarily because as I said before there has been a 
lot of stress involved, duress. 
THE COURT: Are you today under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any physical 
or mental condition that would affect your ability to enter this plea? 
MR HITTLE. Other than frustration, no. 
(R 139 5-6) (emphasis added). The court continued with the plea colloquy and was told 
by defendant that he was not satisfied with the advice he had received from his counsel 
(R 139 6-7) Upon inquiry into the problem, defendant again raised allegations of fraud 
and his counsel's alleged refusal to put the fraud before this tnal court, and provided the 
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court with repeated assurances that he still believed that entering a guilty plea was "the 
expedient way to go" at this point and that he had made the decision to do it (R. 139:7). 
The court thereafter called a bench conference before addressing defendant as 
follows9: 
THE COURT: Mr. Hittle, I want you to know that the reason I called counsel is 
that I want to confirm with them and I want to confirm with you, that this is in fact 
a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea on your part and while I recognize your 
great reluctance to enter this plea, based on your last comment I understand those 
to be an acknowledgment on your part that there is a substantial likelihood or risk 
that the State could prove its case, in this case this is your best assessment of your 
options in light of all the circumstances and that as a result you are making a 
deliberate decision to proceed this way rather than go to trial. 
MR. HITTLE: In light of the circumstances -
THE COURT: Is that a fair characterization? 
MR. HITTLE: - and the way the law is written, this is the expedient way for me at 
this point. 
THE COURT: And what I have just said to you in terms of how I understand what 
you're saying to me, you agree that this, that this is a decision that you are making 
with full understanding of its ramifications and what -
MR. HITTLE: As I understand at this point, yes. 
(R. 139:10-11). The judge then accepted the plea, explaining: 
All right. I am accepting this plea but I've got to let you know counsel, I 
have, I think Mr. Hittle has given every indication that he's feeling himself 
dragged into this and yet he is also acknowledging that he is prepared to go 
9The record contains no specifics as to the discussion which occurred at the bench 
except the court's mention that he confirmed with both counsel that this was a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary plea on defendant's part (R. 139:11). 
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forward with it and I am feeling very much caught in the middle in terms of a 
determination as to whether or not to accept this plea. I conclude that on balance 
Mr. Hittle has addressed the elements of Rule 11 and he is in fact making an 
intelligent and knowing plea, although clearly not one that he feels is fully 
voluntary on his part. That is an issue that I am concerned about but again I think 
that the question of voluntariness doesn't go to any coercion that has been imposed 
upon Mr. Hittle, but certainly, but simply his own sense as to the fairness of the 
proceedings in which he is - or the options that he is faced with. And given that 
kind of narrow definition of whether I'm seeing this as a voluntary or involuntary 
plea, I am going to accept the plea but I just have to say and I want to it put [sic] 
on the record that I am troubled by this. 
(R. 139:15-16). 
The record amply demonstrates that the trial court recognized defendant's claims 
of duress, identified the source of the duress, inquired of counsel as to the impact of the 
duress on the plea, and made an informed determination that the duress pertained to 
issues removed from his entry of the plea and did not impact the voluntariness of the plea 
Given the information before the trial judge, there can be no plain error in his 
determination that the claims of duress did not render the plea involuntary l0 
The court's "troubled" acceptance of the plea, however, did not end the inquiry 
After the court voiced its concern, defense counsel suggested further inquiry into "any 
duress that [defendant] feels he's under nght now that has not already been brought up to 
the Court'' (R. 139:16). The court prompted defendant to articulate his concern in detail 
l0The accuracy of the trial court's perception of the source of defendant's 
frustration was reaffirmed at a later hearing set, in part, to determine payment amounts 
At that hearing, defendant's new counsel reiterated that defendant's problem was the 
alleged inaccuracy of the onginal child support order due to fraud allegedly committed by 
his ex-wife (R. 14014-24). 
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(R. 139:18). Defendant then confirmed that the duress stemmed from fraud he claimed 
his ex-wife practiced on the divorce court in making the determination of how much child 
support he would have to pay (R. 139:18-19). The tnal judge patiently explained to 
defendant that he could not resolve whether the divorce court had established the proper 
amount of child support (R. 139:19). The court then explained: 
. . . [wjhat I wanted to do in terms of ascertaining what it was that you were 
getting at was to make sure that I understood what the basis of your concern was 
and whether it was - well, I just wanted to understand what the basis of your 
concern was. I think you've addressed to my satisfaction what it is that you feel 
the underlying problem is and as I've told you, that's not something that I can 
legitimately address. All I can address is, I have to assume that the child support 
obligation that you were given and that was ordered was an appropriate and lawful 
order and that you failed to follow through with that lawful order of the court and 
you did so to such an extent that this became a criminal matter. That's where I 
come in. 
(R. 139:20-21). 
This record makes it abundantly clear that the tnal court made great efforts to 
determine the source of defendant's claims of duress and frustration and to determine 
whether that duress had any adverse bearing on the voluntanness of the plea he repeatedly 
claimed he wanted to enter. After giving defendant complete freedom to articulate his 
position and after determining, to his satisfaction, that the "duress" stemmed from matters 
beyond the court's jurisdiction to address, the tnal judge determined that defendant in fact 
was entenng a voluntary plea. That determination does not amount to obvious error. 
Additionally, defendant gave the court a second opportunity to review its 
acceptance of the plea by filing a timely motion to withdraw the plea (R. 62-64). For the 
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first time, he claimed that the duress stemmed from his trial counsel's use of force against 
him to ensure that he agreed to enter the plea (id.).11 The lower court not only found no 
such duress, but, after listening to the tape of the plea colloquy, reiterated that he believed 
that defendant entered "a knowing and voluntary" plea: 
. . . I went through this . . . discussion and plea colloquy with Mr. Hittle at great 
length because he was so clearly reluctant and I wanted to make entirely clear that 
he was not being shoe horned into this, that he did not have to take that plea. That 
he could go to trial on the matter and he made it very clear to me that while he 
didn't like it, he felt that this was a rational alternative, that he was entering into of 
his own free w i l l . . . . 
(R. 140:3). Further, his motion to withdraw makes no mention of this allegedly plain 
error below in his motion to withdraw his plea, suggesting that the claimed error did not 
exist or was not obvious. 
Defendant's argument that the mere mention of the word "duress" requires 
rejection of his plea as involuntary is without support and ignores the careful and 
complete exploration of his claims accomplished by the lower court. On this record, the 
court's acceptance of defendant's guilty plea as voluntary was not obvious error. 
B. Defendant's Failure to Sufficiently Articulate any Prejudice from his Alleged 
Error Defeats His Claim 
As with his previous claims of rule 11 violations, defendant includes a brief and 
wholly insufficient mention of prejudice. His bald assertion that the taking of his plea 
was "harmful as a violation of the very reason Rule 11 was adopted" falls far short of his 
1
 'Defendant does not renew this claim on appeal. 
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burden of demonstrating prejudice See Point IB, supra This statement does not 
establish that the alleged error materially affected his decision to plead guilty IdL 
Accordingly, his claim of obvious error fails. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL FAILS BECAUSE HE DOES NOT ESTABLISH AN 
ACTUAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST, A BREACH OF THE DUTY 
OF LOYALTY, OR DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE 
Defendant claims that his tnal counsel rendered ineffective assistance in the entry 
of his guilty plea. Br. of Aplt. at 11-12. Specifically, he claims that at the change of plea 
hearing he "laid a firm foundation upon which to base a [subsequent] claim that his plea 
was involuntary" and that his tnal counsel breached his duty of loyalty by asking the court 
to further examine defendant's claims of duress after the court had already decided to 
accept the plea. Id, at 12-13. Defendant argues that counsel's conduct failed to preserve 
a possible basis upon which to challenge the plea, thereby constituting a breach of 
counsel's duty of loyalty to his client for which this Court may presume prejudice and 
reverse for ineffective assistance. Id. However, defendant fails to establish his claim on 
this record where he does not establish that counsel acted deficiently or against 
defendant's best interest, he admittedly offers only speculation as to the existence of a 
conflict of interest, and he summanly claims entitlement to relief regardless of the lack of 
specificity behind the conflict. Id_ at 13. 
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The challenged incident occurred immediately after the trial court explained that it 
would accept defendant's plea but felt "troubled" about its voluntanness inasmuch as 
defendant "has given every indication that he's feeling himself dragged into this" (R. 
139*115-16) In response, defense counsel stated: 
And again, Your Honor, in [an] abundance of caution, perhaps as [sic] the Court 
can request from Mr. Hittle as to any duress that he feels he's under right now that 
has not already been brought up to the Court? 
(R. 139:16). Defendant thereafter more fully explained that his concern related to the 
fraud allegedly committed by his ex-wife in the establishment of the amount of the 
support payments (R. 139:16-20).12 
l2Defendant does not challenge his trial counsel's first invitation to the court to 
inquire into his claim that he was not satisfied with the advice of counsel, despite the fact 
that defendant's response included an explanation of the duress claims. Prior to the 
court's acceptance of defendant's guilty plea, the following exchange occurred: 
THE COURT: Okay. Are you satisfied with the advice that you've received with 
[sic] Counsel? 
MR. HITTLE: No. 
THE COURT: Well, in that case, do you wish to move forward or not9 
MR. HITTLE: I'll move forward. I've had some other thoughts on this and I know 
of other ways to approach it so I will move forward. 
THE COURT: [Defense counsel] isn't going to be [] the one that is liable here. 
You will be, so I want to make very sure that you understand -
MR. HITTLE. I know and I realize that. 
THE COURT: Okay. He can give you advice but you can choose to disregard it if 
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To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant has the burden of 
demonstrating "that counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment/' Litherland. 2000 UT 76, f 19 (citing 
Strickland v. Washington. 446 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)); State v. 
Silva. 2000 UT App 292, f 22, 13 P.3d 604. Appellate courts indulge a strong 
presumption that trial counsel's conduct under the circumstances might be considered 
sound trial strategy, and will not second-guess counsel's performance on appeal so long 
as a legitimate tactical reason might explain counsel's decision. See State v. Saunders. 
893 P.2d 584, 592 (Utah App. 1995), rev'd on other gnds. 992 P.2d 951 (Utah 1999), 
reh'g denied (Nov. 23, 1999); State v. Callahan. 866 P.2d 590, 593 (Utah App. 1993); see 
also Litherland. 2000 UT 76, ffl[ 17, 19. Proof of ineffectiveness cannot be ua speculative 
you wish. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If I could request of the Court, just so we determine if 
Mr. Hittle is in fact making a knowing and intelligent voluntary plea, I would 
request the Court to ask him the nature of his dissatisfaction with my service so we 
can determine if that impacts his ability to make a decision. 
THE COURT: I think that's a fair request. . . . 
(R. 139:6-7). Defense counsel's request expressly sought clarification of defendant's 
dissatisfaction with his counsel, not the duress defendant had previously mentioned to the 
court. However, defendant's response served to inform the trial court that his claims of 
duress were related to allegations of fraud. Defendant does not claim error from this 
exchange. 
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matter/' but must be a "demonstrable reality/' State v Chacon, 962 P 2d 48, 50 (Ltah 
1998); Codiannav Moms. 660 P 2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983). 
Defendant must then demonstrate "that counsel's deficient performance was 
prejudicial—i e , that it affected the outcome of the case." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ 19 
(citing Strickland, 466 U S. at 687-88). To show the requisite prejudice, defendant must 
"'proffer sufficient evidence to support a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" Parsons, 
871 P.2d at 522 (citations and additional quotations omitted). "'A reasonable probability 
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'" Alvarez v Galetka, 
933 P 2d 987, 990 (Utah 1997) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 
However, when a claim of ineffective assistance is based on an assertion of a 
conflict of interest, "defendant^ must show, as a threshold matter, that tnal counsel cwas 
required to make a choice advancing his own interests to the detriment of his client's 
interests.'" State v Brandlev, 972 P 2d 78, 85 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v Taylor, 
947 P 2d 681, 686 (Utah 1997), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 833 (1998)) (additional citations 
omitted) Further, defendant has the burden of establishing with specificity that the actual 
conflict not only existed but adversely affected his counsel's performance See Brandlev, 
972 P 2d at 85; State v Johnson, 823 P 2d 484, 488 (Utah App. 1991) Only when this 
burden has been met will prejudice be presumed. See Brandlev, 972 P 2d at 85, Johnson, 
823 P 2d at 488. Accordingly, before prejudice will be presumed in this case, defendant 
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must establish an actual conflict of interest resulting in a breach of counsel's duty of 
loyalty 
Under the facts at hand, defendant has not established that his trial counsel failed 
to function as an effective counsel. Defendant speculates, but does not establish, that his 
counsel was influenced in any manner by a conflict in loyalties to the court or anyone 
else To the contrary, counsel's actions on this record are consistent with zealous 
representation of this defendant. It appears that both counsel and defendant believed that 
the entry of a guilty plea was in defendant's best interests Defense counsel knew that 
defendant had decided to accept the plea bargain, knew that defendant wanted the plea 
entered, and knew that defendant's "duress" stemmed from collateral issues which were 
beyond the court's ability to redress m these proceedings (R. 139* 1-3, 6-7). The court had 
been assured by counsel that the plea was in fact voluntary, and defendant repeatedly told 
the court that he had decided this was the most expedient way, he'd made up his mind, 
and he would go through with it (R. 139 3, 5-8, 10-11) When called by the judge to a 
bench conference, defense counsel apparently represented to the court that he believed 
this to be a voluntary plea, and the court thereafter accepted the plea in partial reliance on 
what was said in that bench conference (R 139*10-11). Nothing on this record suggests 
that defense counsel had any reason to believe that defendant might want to withdraw his 
plea as involuntary 
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The trial court thereafter accepted the plea, but did so with a serious expression o( 
uncertainty as to the plea's voluntariness (R. 139:15-16). This rendered the plea 
vulnerable not only to a change of heart by defendant, but by the court as well so long as 
the court remained "troubled" about the plea. Faced with this uncertainty, having heard 
defendant's repeated assurances to the court that he wanted to enter the plea, and 
believing that the plea was in defendant's best interest, defense counsel made the 
reasonable strategic decision to have defendant elaborate on his claims of duress to 
reassure the court of the plea's validity. As defendant claims, this strategy may have 
ensured that defendant would not thereafter be able to claim that the plea was involuntary. 
However, counsel has no responsibility to aid his client to inject invited error into the plea 
process by leading the court into accepting the plea as voluntary while trying to establish 
a basis for a subsequent withdrawal of the plea as involuntary. Another counsel may not 
have made the same strategic decision, but it remains a reasonable strategy for effective 
counsel to pursue. 
Moreover, defendant fails to establish that it would, in fact, have been in his best 
interest to avoid the final explanation of his "duress" at the change of plea hearing. 
Defendant had already identified for the court the source of the duress, and his challenged 
explanation merely confirmed that the duress did not render this plea involuntary. 
Whether the information came out at the change of plea hearing or necessarily arose at a 
subsequent hearing on a motion to withdraw the plea as involuntary, it would have the 
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same effect. Even without defendant's final explanation as to the source of the duress, 
the record is clear that the tnal court properly understood the situation. See Point IIIA, 
supra. Accordingly, defendant has not established that it was in his best interest to remain 
silent following the tnal court's "troubled" acceptance of his plea. 
Defendant presents nothing more than a simple case of buyer's remorse, and, 
without more, this Court cannot say that tnal counsel's representation of defendant should 
be regarded as anything other than effective.13 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
lower court's denial of defendant's premature motion for reduction of his conviction. 
I3Moreover, as defendant did not establish that his plea was involuntary, see Point 
III, supra, he cannot establish the requisite prejudice for his claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel. See State v Strain, 885 P 2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994) (citing Stnckland, 
466 U S. at 697) (if it is easier to decide the issue on the prejudice prong, the court need 
not reach the deficient performance prong). 
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ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
The State requests that this matter be set for oral argument and that a published 
opinion issue. This case presents a novel and important issue regarding the requisite 
pleading and proof of plain error claims in the context of guilty pleas. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /V day of December, 2001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
KRIS C. LEONA 
Assistant Attorney General 
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day of December, 2001. 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
76-7-201. Criminal nonsupport. 
(1) A person commits criminal nonsupport if, having a spouse, a child, or 
children under the age of 18 years, he knowingly fails to provide for the support 
of the spouse, child, or children when any one of them is in needy circum-
stances 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), criminal nonsupport is a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(3) Criminal nonsupport is a felony of the third degree if the actor 
(a) has been convicted one or more times of nonsupport, whether in this 
state, any other state, or any court of the United States; or 
(b) committed the offense while residing in another state. 
(4) For purposes of this section "child" includes a child born out of wedlock 
whose paternity has been admitted by the actor or has been established in a 
civil suit. 
(5) In a prosecution under this section, it is no defense that the person to be 
supported received necessary support from a source other than the defendant. 
(6) (a) In a prosecution for criminal nonsupport under this section, it is an 
affirmative defense that the accused is unable to provide support Volun-
tary unemployment or underemployment by the defendant does not give 
rise to that defense. 
(b) Not less than 20 days before trial the defendant shall file and serve 
on the prosecuting attorney a notice, in writing, of his intention to claim 
the affirmative defense of inability to provide support. The notice shall 
specifically identify the factual basis for the defense and the names and 
addresses of the witnesses who the defendant proposes to examine in 
order to establish the defense. 
(c) Not more than ten days after receipt of the notice described in 
Subsection (b), or at such other time as the court may direct, the 
prosecuting attorney shall file and serve the defendant with a notice 
containing the names and addresses of the witnesses who the state 
proposes to examine in order to contradict or rebut the defendants claim 
<d) Failure to comply with the requirements of Subsection (b) or ic> 
entitles the opposing party to a continuance to allow for preparation If the 
court finds that a party's failure to comply is the result of bad faith, it may 
impose appropriate sanctions. 
History: C. 1953, 76-7-201, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, 4 76-7-201; 1974, ch. 32, 4 21; 
1995, ch. 289, 4 I. 
ADDENDUM B 
j L'pon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant -nail oe 
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court The 
pendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a 
reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
. b1 A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason 
0f insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative 
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity If a defendant refuses to plead or 
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not 
guilty-
, c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty the case shall forthwith be 
*et for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an 
early trial. In case9 other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
11) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly 
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
i3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the 
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court 
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
i4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that 
the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
iB) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant 
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
i5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that 
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
• 7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record 
or, if used, an affidavit reciting these factors after the court has established 
that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the 
affidavit. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be 
sufficient that the affidavit has been read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to 
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to 
make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included 
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by 
the court. 
'2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall 
advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not 
binding on the court. 
ihM 1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
i2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement 
and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge 
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the 
proposed disposition will be approved. 
13) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in confor-
mity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then 
call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a 
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no 
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a 
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A 
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
«j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to 
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a 
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103. 
• Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996; November 1, 1997.) 
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2 HONORABLE JUDGE DENISE P. LINDBERG 
3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 MR. TORRENCE: Okay, Your Honor, I believe we nave a 
5 resolution worked out here if the Court approves. What's 
6 anticipated is that in return for a guilty plea to Count 1, 
7 criminal non-support is a Class A misdemeanor, the State would 
8 be willing to amend the information to dismiss Count 2 in its 
9 entirety. I have gone over with him to (inaudible) entering a 
10 misdemeanor guilty plea including his rights to a ]ury trial 
11 and other rights that he would be giving up by entering into 
12 the plea bargain. We have also discussed the consequence of 
13 entering a guilty plea to a Class A misdemeanor including that 
14 the Court could impose up to 365 days in jail and impose a fine 
15 of $2500 to which an 85 percent surcharge could be added. 
16 Part of our understanding with the attorney general's 
17 office is that Mr. Hittle would be agreeing to pay back tne ::-
18 amount of arrears owing on his child support figured at tne 
19 rate of - which was figured at the rate originally of $2"5 a 
20 month. So that what he would be paying, is that he would start 
21 paying the ongoing child support of $275 a month and in 
22 addition to that he would pay a figure toward his arrears of 
23 principle and interest which, based on the figure of about 
24 earning $11.00 an hour we assume it would be somewhere m t~e 
25 range of $272.00, $275.00 a month. We have not - ratner 
1 32"70.00 co 3235.00 a month. We don't have tnat exact fi^re 
2 yet because that will depend on the next ]ob that he takes ar.: 
3 exactly how much his hourly and monthly rate is. That's -
4 THE COURT: So he would be paying approximately 
5 $550.00 per month? 
6 MR. TORRENCE: Approximately $550.00/$560 . 00 a mor.tr., 
7 assuming he earns about $11.00 an hour at his next JOD. 
8 THE COURT: Is he between jobs? What's the status 
9 there? 
10 MR. HITTLE: I work day labor when I can find a ]CD, 
11 Judge. As I explained to the attorneys in the conference room, 
12 every time I go to work the garnishment is attached to my 
13 check. At $11.00 an hour that figures out to be $444.00 a week 
14 at 40 hours. They automatically take half of that on the 
15 garnishment which is $222.00, taxes on the $444.00 is well over 
16 $100.00 and that leaves me with somewhere around $100.00 a wee< 
17 to live on. I'm behind on my rent. I've had discontinuance 
13 notices on my electric bill. My gas is shut off. I've sougnt 
19 help from the local church organizations and I can at least 
20 keep my head above water by picking up day labor where there's 
21 no garnishment. 
22 MR. TORRENCE: So Your Honor, our understanding witn 
23 the plea bargain would be that the attorney general's office 
24 would be recommending that Mr. Hittle receive a suspended :ail 
25 sentence and be allowed to continue out on probation for 36 
rcr.zr.s ana chat he, as we stated, oegm paying zze S"5.JC = 
2 month ongoing child support as well as the to-oe-deterr^ir.ed 
3 figure toward his arrears based on his next full time ;oc. 
4 THE COURT: Well, what I want to know is effective 
5 when would this kind of payment schedule begin tnen? 
6 MR. TORRENCE: I guess that would be up to the Co-rt. 
7 Our understanding was that would be as soon as he's able to 
8 obtain full time employment. 
9 THE COURT: All right, Mr. Hittle, before I accepc 
10 this proposed resolution, I want to review with you what 
11 matters that counsel has probably already covered with you c^z 
12 that are important for me to put on the record. You understara 
13 that - well first of all, you understand this proposed 
14 resolution as a way of, the proposal as a way of dealing witn 
15 this matter? 
16 MR. HITTLE: I understand it as being one of the wa/s 
17 of dealing with it, yes. 
18 THE COURT: More to the point, do you agree with tn.s 
19 as a way of resolving this matter or do you wish to proceed :: 
20 trial? 
21 MR. HITTLE I've been placed under considerable 
22 duress but I'll agree to it. 
23 THE COURT: Well, you can either freely and 
24 voluntarily enter into this plea bargain or we can go to tr.a_, 
25 but if there are continuing reservations or issues about tn.s 
1 men - rry duty is to establish tnat you are entering i~tc --
2 plea bargain from your own personal decision that tms is _~ 
3 your best interest to proceed in light of all circumstances 
4 that you're facing. If you are not prepared to accept tnat 
5 oelieve that that is the appropriate resolution tnen I, you 
6 know, I think counsel has already indicated to you that you 
7 go forward with trial. So the question again is, in light c 
8 all the circumstances do you agree with this as a resolution 
9 for handling this matter? 
10 MR. HITTLE: All the circumstances have not been 
11 brought forward yet at this point, one of which was fraud on 
12 ex-wife's part at the time of filing. 
13 THE COURT: That is a matter for a different setti 
14 That's not the issue here. The issue here for me is, you ar 
15 looking at an offer to plead to a Class A misdemeanor m 
16 exchange for dismissal of a third degree felony with an 
17 understanding of what the penalties can be on this Class A a 
18 either accepting the proposed resolution or not accepting it 
19 and proceed to trial on the felony and the Class A. These a 
20 the issues. That is the sole issue before me. 
21 Let me go about it this way. Do you understand tr 
22 by entering this plea today as it has been proposed you are 
23 giving up your right to go to trial; you're right to corfr— 
24 and cross examine witnesses, to present evidence on your cer 
25 or to refrain from presenting evidence if your wish and to ^ 
* p >. Itate carry the ourden of proving ceyona reaso^ac.e zc^z" 
2 all of the elements of the offense as charged; to -ave 
3 witnesses brought on your behalf to court to testify, witn "~e 
4 compulsion of a subpoena if necessary. You have the right ~oz 
5 to commit yourself unless you choose to take the stand m *n^c~ 
6 case you would be subject to cross examination. You have t~e 
7 right to, if you were to be convicted and found guilty 
8 following a trial by an impartial decision maker, or a ]ury ^ 
9 this matter, you would have the right to appeal. You're gi/.^j 
10 up those rights by entering this plea today. Do you understate: 
11 that? 
12 MR. HITTLE: I understand that I'm giving up those 
13 rights. 
14 THE COURT: And you're prepared to do that? 
15 MR. HITTLE: I'm prepared to do it. 
16 , THE COURT: Okay. And you understand as Mr. Torrence 
17 has explained, that you could be facing a maximum sentence of 
18 up to a year in ]ail and fines including a surcharge of over 
19 $4600? 
20 MR. HITTLE: I understand that. 
21 THE COURT: Has there been any other offer, threat, 
22 or whatever offer given to you, made to you to get you to e-cer 
23 into this plea other than what has been said here m court? 
24 MR. HITTLE: The thing that disturbs me, Judge, -.s 
25 the State refuses to consider that there was fraud involved. I 
1 understand I'm. supposed to take that up elsewhere. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. But to get you to enter this c.ea, 
3 there have been no other offers, no other threats, nothing e_se 
4 given to you to get you to enter this plea? What I'm getting 
5 at is, this is something that you are choosing to do 
6 voluntarily? 
7 MR. HITTLE: I am doing it voluntarily because as I 
8 said before there has been a lot of stress involved, duress. 
9 THE COURT: Are you today under the influence of 
10 alcohol, drugs or any physical or mental condition that would 
11 affect your ability to enter this plea? 
12 MR. HITTLE: Other than frustration, no. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. Are you satisfied with the advice 
14 that you've received with Counsel? 
15 MR. HITTLE: No. 
16 THE COURT: Well, in that case, do you wish to move 
17 forward or not? 
18 MR. HITTLE: I'll move forward. I've had some otner 
19 thoughts on this and I know of other ways to approach it so I 
20 will move forward. 
21 THE COURT: Mr. Torrence isn't going to be to tne ere 
22 that is liable here. You will be, so I want to maxe very s.re 
23 that you understand -
24 MR. HITTLE: I know and I realize that. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. He can give you advice but you :a-
cnocse to disregard it if you wisn. 
2 MR. TORRENCE: If I could request of the Court, ;-s: 
3 so we determine if Mr. Hittle is in fact making a knowing a~:i 
4 intelligent voluntary plea, I would request the Court to as< 
5 him tne nature of his dissatisfaction with my service so *e can 
6 determine if that impacts his ability to make a decision. 
7 THE COURT: I think that's a fair request. 
8 Mr. Hittle, can you please articulate what it is thai 
9 is the problem? 
10 MR. HITTLE: He has refused to put certain things re 
11 this Court that I wanted to put forward to this Court. You sa* 
12 what happened. You witnessed what happened here a few minutes 
13 ago. They came up with a fraudulent amount, they have dollar 
14 figures for me and I asked where they got it from, they nad :: 
15 change it. Like I said, there's been fraud from square one m 
16 this case. Right now this seems to be the expedient way to go. 
17 THE COURT: Do you understand that for me to accept 
18 your guilty plea, I either have to receive from you an 
19 acknowledgment that you are, in fact, guilty of these charges 
20 to which you are pleading or that you concede that the State 
21 could prove the facts even if you are not prepared to concede 
22 them, that you are prepared to concede that the State ccuia 
23 make its case, 
24 MR. HITTLE: I will repeat that I realize this tre 
25 expedient way to go at this time. I've made the decision a^ d 
1 I'll live with it. 
2 THE COURT: All right, let me indicate to you 
3 specifically you understand the nature of the elements and tr.e 
4 elements of the offense to which you are entering a guilty plea 
5 in this case is a Class A misdemeanor? 
6 MR. HITTLE: I do, 
7 THE COURT: And it's alleged that you knowingly 
8 failed to provide for support for your minor child, that child 
9 being eighteen years of age and in circumstances that are needy 
10 or would be needy but for support received from a source otner 
11 that defendant. 
12 MR. HITTLE: I understand what the elements are. 
13 THE COURT: Do you also understand that there is a 
14 factual basis - and I'm going to ask for that factual basis m 
15 a moment - but for me to accept this factual basis, it eitner 
16 has to establish that the charged crime was actually committee 
17 by you or if you refuse or are otherwise unable to admit 
13 culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to 
19 establish a substantial risk of your conviction. 
20 MR. HITTLE: I understand it under the way the law is 
21 written that they have reason to present their case, whether 
22 they can prove it or not is another story, but they nave reason 
23 to (inaudible). 
24 THE COURT: Now, you would have to concede that tnere 
25 is a substantial likelihood that the State could oroceed, -as a 
1 sufficient basis to proceed and establish a substantial ::s< ::' 
2 your conviction and that as a result you're making this as a 
3 knowing, voluntary determination that this is the option that 
4 you would rather pursue. That's what's at issue here. 
5 MR. TORRENCE: If you want to do that, you would net 
6 necessarily have to admit every element of the offense. 
7 Your Honor, just for the record I did approach Mr. 
8 Peterson just a minute ago to see if he would consider a no 
9 contest plea for Mr. Hittle in this matter. He has indicated 
10 that the State would not agree to a no contest plea. 
11 What the Judge is talking about here in terms of a 
12 plea, you can either enter a guilty plea which would knowingly 
13 admit that you did all the elements of the offense that we 
14 discussed here and committed the conduct mentioned, or you 
15 could enter what is called a -
16 THE COURT: Alford. 
17 MR. TORRENCE: - guilty plea pursuant to North 
18 Carolina v Alford which means that you are admitting guilty in 
19 the sense that you are accepting responsibility and the 
20 consequences with a guilty plea because you believe the State 
21 has sufficient evidence to create a substantial likelihood that 
22 you would be found guilty but you would not have to necessary 
23 admit each and every element of the offense. The result wcula 
24 be the same in terms of the sentencing. 
25 MR. HITTLE: I think that might work two ways too. I 
1 mean, I can say that I could think they have it or I can say : 
2 ' think they don't have it. That's an unknown as this time. I 
3 will admit to it that they might have it, I don't know. I mean 
4 nobody knows that at this time. Not even you know that. 
5 MR. TORRENCE: The question is do you want to enter a 
6 guilty plea or not? 
7 THE COURT: Essentially you are weighing on the 
8 balance your risk of proceeding with the prosecution and trial 
9 or opting to take this plea because there is a substantial 
10 likelihood that they could prove their case in which case you 
11 would be facing a felony. Those are the issues. That's the 
12 issue and as a result of that weighing, you've decided that you 
13 are prepared to assume that responsibility for that. 
14 MR. DITTLE: As I've said I see this is the expedient 
15 way to go at this point. In other words, I realize that they 
16 could probably prove the case, it's the way the law is written. 
17 MR. TORRENCE: In that case, Your Honor, I would as.< 
18 that if Mr. Hittle does enter a guilty plea here today that 
19 would be considered a guilty plea a guilty plea pursuant to 
20 North Carolina v Alford. 
21 THE COURT: That would be the only basis under which 
22 I could so do it. 
23 MR. DITTLE: I can agree with that. 
24 THE COURT: All right. Can I get counsel to approach 
25 please? 
1 • (Whereupon a sidebar was held.) 
2 THE COURT: Mr. Hittie, I want you to know that tr.e 
3 reason I called counsel is that I wanted to confirm with them 
4 and I want to confirm with you, that this is in fact a kncwir.7, 
5 intelligent, and voluntary plea on your part and while I 
6 recognize your great reluctance to enter this plea, based en 
7 your last comment I understand those to be an acknowledgment on 
8 your part that there is a substantial likelihood or risk that 
9 the State could prove its case, in which case this is your best 
10 assessment of your options in light of all the circumstances 
11 and that as a result you are making a deliberate decision to 
12 proceed this way rather than go to trial, 
13 MR. HITTLE: In light of the circumstances -
14 THE COURT: Is that a fair characterization? 
15 MR. HITTLE: - and the way the law is written, this 
16 is the expedient way for me at this point. 
17 THE COURT: And what I have just said to you in terms 
18 of how I understand what you're saying to me, you agree that 
19 this, that this is a decision that you are making with full 
20 understanding of its ramifications and what -
21 MR. HITTLE: As I understand at this point, yes. 
22 THE,COURT: All right. I have no, I do not have any 
23 questions as to your competence to enter this plea, I just want 
24 to make sure we are all on the same page as to where you are 
25 with this plea and what responsibility that you are assuming 
1 for it. 
2 All right. In light of all that has been discussed, 
3 how do you plead to one court of criminal non-support as a 
4 Class A misdemeanor? 
5 MR. HITTLE: Guilty. 
6 THE COURT: And Counsel, can you please outline the 
7 factual basis and support the plea? 
8 MR. TORRENCE: Yes Your Honor, and again for the 
9 record I would request that guilty plea be entered as -
10 THE COURT: It will be entered as an Alford plea, 
11 guilty pursuant to Alford. 
12 MR. TORRENCE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
13 MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, the factual basis for the 
14 Class A misdemeanor is that between February 1, 1997 and 
15 November 30, 1997, during that time Mr. Hittle knowingly faiie: 
16 to provide support for his minor child, Kimberly Hittle, durin: 
17 the period of time when she was under eighteen years of age an: 
18 was in needy circumstances or would have been in needy 
19 circumstances but for support received from a source other thar 
20 himself or paid on his behalf. 
21 THE COURT: All right. You acknowledge those facts 
22 as outlined? 
23 MR. HITTLE: Yes. 
24 THE COURT: All right, Mr. Hittle, in light of that : 
25 believe that the facts support the plea which you are entering 
and I am going to' accept your plea as a knowing and voluntary 
2 plea. I want you to understand that by entering this plea, :ne 
3 of the rights that you are giving up is the right to appeal, 
4 but you do have thirty days within which you can move this 
5 Court to withdraw your plea if you give me a good reason in 
6 writing for that request. Do you understand what I've just 
7 said? 
8 MR. HITTLE: Yes, I understand that. 
9 THE COURT: All right. 
10 MR. TORRENCE: Excuse me, Your Honor, for the record 
11 I have informed Mr. Hittle that good cause to withdraw his 
12 guilty plea would be more than changing his mind but coming up 
13 with what he considers new evidence. He would have to show 
14 that he was - I'm sorry - he was either under the influence of 
15 medication or drugs or in someway was not fully able to 
16 understand and appreciate what he was doing here today. 
17 THE COURT: All right. 
18 And you understand that, Mr. Hittle? 
19 MR. HITTLE: I understand that part of it but I wculi 
20 also understand that I considered the fact that there are 
21 subpoenas out to various employers getting information en 
22 withholding that are not in at this time and that could 
23 seriously change things too. 
24 THE COURT: I'm not sure I follow. 
25 MR. HITTLE: Withholding. 
1 THE COURT: Right. 
2 [ MR. HITTLE: Okay, that could seriously change 
3 certain accusations here. If they come back as I think they 
4 might and show that I actually did make *x' number of payments 
5 'x' number of times. 
6 THE COURT: Mr. Hittle, all of these issues, that is 
7 what we are here about right now. 
8 MR. PETERSON: Your ,Honor, the one sense in which 
9 that wouldn't change the picture, is that if the information 
10 that we're trying to get from his past employers and the State 
11 Unemployment Office show that he has, in fact, paid more money 
12 already than the State already recognizes, then that -
13 THE COURT: Then that would certainly go toward the 
14 amount that he owes. 
15 MR. PETERSON: That's right, that would reduce the 
16 total amount that he owes. 
17 THE COURT: Correct. But that does not eliminate 
13 that, or go toward the basis for withdrawing the plea under 
19 this charge. 
20 MR. HITTLE: May I say something? 
21 MR. PETERSON: That's correct, Your Honor. If he 
22 needs more than that -
23 MR. HITTLE: It could also mean that there are *x' 
24 number of months where payments were made and it's being shewn 
25 that they're not being made. In other words -
1 THE COURT: That goes toward the total amount of 
2 money that you would be owing and that is a determination that 
3 is going to be made as part of sentencing in terms of what you 
4 owe and there will be information requested that is going to 
5 provide that. 
6 MR. HITTLE: That's not what I'm talking about. I'm 
7 talking about the statute reads that not making any payments 
8 for 18 months during a given 24-period month, right? 
9 MR. TORRENCE: You did not plead guilty to the third 
10 degree felony so that's not relevant. For the Class A 
11 misdemeanor, all you're acknowledging is that you failed to 
12 provide support. It's not for any set number of months and 
13 it's not any set dollar amount. So do you understand that? 
14 THE COURT: All that that would do is that if in 
15 fact, you were not credited, you know, with certain payments 
16 that in fact you did make, that would just go towards the 
17 arrearage that you would then be required to address. But you 
18 understand that that would not constitute good cause for 
19 changing or withdrawing the plea? 
20 MR. HITTLE: If that's the way it's written, that's 
21 the way it's written, Your Honor. (Inaudible) much argument 
22 with that then. 
23 THE COURT: All right. I am accepting this plea but 
24 I've got to let you know counsel, I have, I think Mr. Hittle 
25 has given every indication that he's feeling himself dragged 
1 into this and yet he is also acknowledging chat he is preparer 
2 to go forward with it and I am feeling very much caugnt m " e 
3 middle in terms of a determination as to whether or not to 
4 accept this plea. I conclude that on balance Mr. Hittie nas 
5 addressed the elements of Rule 11 and he is in fact making an 
6 intelligent and knowing plea, although clearly not one that r.e 
7 feels is fully voluntary on his part. That is an issue mat I 
8 am concerned about but again I think that the question of 
9 voluntariness doesn't go to any coercion that has been impose a 
10 upon Mr. Hittie, but certainly, but simply his own sense as to 
11 the fairness of the proceedings in which he is - or the opticrs 
12 that he is faced with. And given that kind of narrow 
13 definition of whether I'm seeing this as a voluntary or 
14 involuntary plea, I am going to accept the plea but I just nave 
15 to say and I want to it put on the record that I am troubled cy 
16 this. 
17 MR, TORRENCE: And again, Your Honor, in abundance of 
18 caution, perhaps as the Court can request from Mr. Hittie as zz 
19 any duress that he feels he's under right now that nas not 
20 already been brought up to the Court? 
21 THE COURT: Mr. Hittie? 
22 MR. HITTLE: Can I tell you a story, Judge, what 
23 happened to a friend of mine? 
24 THE COURT: Well, sir, I don't know about any frier.: 
25 of yours being relevant to this. What I want to know is acc-t 
1 ycJ , m a t ' s wnat ' s r e l evan t to me. 
2 MR. HITTLE: This I think you will see is relevant. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. 
4 MR. HITTLE: A friend of mine ran afoul of the la* 
5 through a divorce many years ago, middle x80fs, nis name is 
6 Paul. He ended up in a halfway house and then got out on his 
7 own. 
8 I was at the time in a singles group, voluntary 
9 singles group providing assistance to individuals at that 
10 halfway house, Bonneville Corrections, providing transportation 
11 for some of the residents there. I kept track of Paul over t~e 
12 years and some years ago, I don't know when, he was in the 
13 hospital visiting a nurse friend of his when a judge was 
14 brought in on a gurney. The judge and Paul got involved m 
15 talking somehow or another. I don't know the circumstances 
16 there. Paul told the judge of his past and what had happened 
17 and what had gone on. The judge as soon as he was able, 
18 expunged the record. 
19 Now, there are certain things that have gone en pr:;: 
20 to this case here today, that need to be addressed. I 
21 mentioned fraud. In other words what I'm saying is a juage it 
22 the State of Utah is a judge in the State of Utah. What I'-n 
23 saying is I feel personally that you can address certain zr.~~zs 
24 that I've been told can't be brought up here. 
25 THE COURT: Counsel, can you comment? I'd like to 
near rrcm eitner. 
2 MR. TORRENCE: Can we approach, Your Honor? 
3 THE COURT: You may. 
4 (Whereupon a sidebar conference was held.) 
5 THE COURT: All right, Mr. Hittle, it has been a long 
6 day but, I'm not quite sure I know where you're going or wha: 
7 you're alluding to. 
8 MR. HITTLE: I would be happy to take it up at 
9 another time. 
10 THE COURT: No. Let's deal with it now, if I find 
11 that it is something that I can't deal with I will tell you ana 
12 if it's something I can deal with, then I will. 
13 MR. HITTLE: Okay, at the time of the divorce, my ex-
14 wife or wife at the time, claimed by sworn affidavit that I was 
15 negligent and had made $15.00 an hour. I took into the 
16 courtroom and I have it here with me today, pay stubs that 
17 showed I was making $9.42 an hour. That is pure unadulterated 
18 fraud on her part. She knew better. She intended to commit: 
19 fraud. It's what can I get from the system; how far can I mil< 
20 it? And that is proven under Federal case law California 
21 versus Serhan, intend is proven when the act is committed, 
22 okay? She intended to commit the fraud and that was on - ana 
23 this support stems directly from that. I also have -
24 THE COURT: So what you're challenging is the 
25 underlying child support obligation that was imposed by ana 
1 signed off by another :uage? 
2 MR. HITTLE: Yes. And I also have with me today a 
3 copy of the minute entry by at that time Commissioner Buenler 
4 but later signed by the ]udge, a statement or an order I g^ess 
5 it would be called that I do not make one payment until I - I 
6 do not owe one red cent until the defendant, being my ex-wife, 
7 my wife at the time, verifies all the monies correctly. I nave 
8 never seen that to this day, judge, never. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. 
10 MR. HITTLE: Under the statute, I have a right to 
11 that. 
12 THE COURT: Let me indicate to you that this is net 
13 the appropriate place and the reason for that is because child 
14 support obligations or the other kinds of orders associated 
15 with the divorce are retained in the jurisdiction of tne court 
16 that issued those orders. If there were problems or issues 
17 related to that, the appropriate forum for that was back m 
18 that court with whatever evidence you have or with a filing of 
19 request to modify the child support obligation with your 
20 evidence and the court would have taken, would have held a 
21 hearing on the matter and adjudicated the matter and determined 
22 whether or not the child support obligation that had oeen 
23 ordered should be amended or not. I am assuming that you 
24 either didn't do that or it got adjudicated contrary to your 
25 view of how it should have been done. But, either you aian't 
1 challenge it or it got handled, you know, against ycu c-t 
2 whatever may have been the case and in the terms of the 
3 correctness of that adjudication, it is beyond my autncnty :: 
4 second guess or go back and determine whether or not that 
5 ooligation, in fact, arose or not. I have to accept that tne 
6 obligation is as has been stated and that it was pursuant to a 
7 proper court order that you knew and had had opportunity to 
8 address in the appropriate forum. So as to, you know, I don't 
9 know that history but that is not something that I can take 
10 cognizance of. 
11 MR. HITTLE: The last thing Judge Wilkinson said tne 
12 last time we were before him was, I don't want to see this case 
13 in front of me again. I've filed paperwork since then and he's 
14 never accepted anything. I have gone through what you've saia, 
15 okay, and it's not been heard. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. I'm not going to second guess 
17 another sitting judge about a matter under which the court 
18 retains jurisdiction. That is not an issue that even if I 
19 wanted to, which I'm not inclined to go there, but even if I 
20 wanted to, it would not be an appropriate exercise of my...it's 
21 beyond my authority to do that. But, what I wanted to do in 
22 terms of ascertaining what it was that you were getting at was 
23 to make sure that I understood what the basis of your concern 
24 was and whether it was - well, I ]ust wanted to understand wnat 
25 the basis of your concern was. I think you've addressed tc my 
1 satisfaction wnat it is that you feel the jnder-yi^g prcc_e~ --
2 and as I've told you, that's not something that I can 
3 legitimately address. All I can address is, I have to assu~e 
4 that the child support obligation that you were given ana r a : 
5 was ordered was an appropriate and lawful order and tnat ^c. 
6 failed to follow through with that lawful order of the coar: 
7 and you did so to such an extent that this became a cr:m:na. 
8 matter. That's where I come m . 
9 MR. HITTLE: That's your prerogative, I recognize 
10 it. 
11 THE COURT: Unless counsel you have some concerns, I 
12 do not have any competency concerns. 
13 MR. TORRENCE: No, Your Honor, I believe that Mr. 
14 Hittle is fully competent today in this Court. 
15 THE COURT: All right, if Mr. Hittle could then s^g-
16 the Statement of Defendant, it will be incorporated into t^e 
17 record. 
18 MR. PETERSON: And again for the record, Your Honor, 
19 Mr. Hittle is entering a guilty plea to criminal non-support. 
20 THE COURT: As a Class A misdemeanor. 
21 MR. PETERSON: As a Class A misdemeanor, Utan Coae 
22 76-7-201 and the statement of specific comprising elements 
23 indicates that "I knowingly failed to provide support for ~y 
24 minor child, Kimberly, when she was under eighteen years c^a 
25 and in needy circumstances or would have been in needy 
1 circumstances but for support received from anotner source." 
2 THE COURT: Correct. 
3 MR. TORRENCE: For the record therefore Mr. Hittle 
4 has signed the Statement of Defendant. 
5 THE COURT: All right. I have also signed the 
6 statement certifying that in this Court's view Mr. Hittle nas 
7 entered a knowing and voluntary plea and as I said, you do nave 
8 30 days within which, for good cause as explained to you, you 
9 can request or withdraw the plea if you make that request m 
10 writing. 
11 All right. What - I do have information, I don't 
12 know that a pre-sentence report would particularly assist tne 
13 Court further in addressing this matter. So unless Counsel 
14 think it would be helpful to the Court, I -
15 MR. PETERSON: I'm sorry. We're not requesting t.tat, 
16 Your Honor. 
17 MR. TORRENCE: No, we're not requesting that. 
13 THE COURT: All right. In that case, given tnat 
19 there has been a proposed, that the proposed disposition also 
20 includes some recommendations in terms of sentencing, ana Mr. 
21 Hittle, counsel, you are waiving his sentencing time on his 
22 behalf. Let me just explain. 
23 Mr. Hittle, you have the right to not be sentenced 
24 today, to wait at least two days. You can be sentenced witr.ir. 
25 two days from now or forty-five days, somewhere in that per::: 
1 or since we're here now, we can proceed with sentencing. Zz 
2 you want to be sentenced now or do you wish to come back m t*c 
3 days? 
4 MR. HITTLE: Might as well do it now. It's probacly 
5 going to be the same. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. Well, first let me indicate tnat 
7 as part of the plea negotiations and in recognition of your 
8 plea to the Class A misdemeanor, the remaining count of third 
9 degree felony is hereby dismissed. 
10 Mr. Hittle, I am imposing a sentence which for now 
11 will be suspended but which if we have any problems in 
12 compliance with the orders of this Court, will result in an 
13 imposition of this sentence and if I have to impose it, it will 
14 be consecutive to anything else that he's holding you at tnat 
15 time. So I am imposing a term of 365 days suspended. I am 
16 placing you on probation with Adult Probation and Parole for a 
17 period of 36 months. You will have five business days within 
18 which to report to Adult Probation and Parole and make 
19 arrangements to initiate probation with them. First, and 
20 foremost is your obligation under probation is that you will 
21 commit no other new violations of the law and that you will 
22 abide by all the lawful orders of this Court and any other 
23 court that has jurisdiction over any matter in which you are 
24 involved. You are to abide by the usual and ordinary 
25 conditions of probation by AP&P, of AP&P. It has been propcsei 
and I accept that you will oe making payment of rest::-:::" = ~-
2 for arrearage equal and in an amount to be determined ana 
3 provided to this Court. 
4 How long will it take, counsel? 
5 MR. PETERSON: We can get that figure in -
6 THE COURT: Sixty days? 
7 MR. PETERSON: Thirty days is sufficient. 
8 THE COURT: All right. Then that figure will oe 
9 provided, but my understanding is that you will be paying m 
10 the neighborhood of $550 per month. The first payment will oe 
11 due in 30 days and thereafter every 30 days until the full 
12 amount is paid and that full amount will be provided to the 
13 court within 30 days by the State. You will be notified ana if 
14 you contest that amount then you can request a hearing. 
15 In addition I am imposing $250 in recoupment for 
16 services of counsel in this matter. I am not going to - given 
17 that there are substantial arrearages and restitution owing, I 
18 am not going to impose an additional fine. 
19 I am going to add a couple of other conditions 
20 because I am - it's clear to me that you still have not deal: 
21 with this in any kind of a productive way - your own emotions 
22 and anger over this matter. Accordingly I am going to refer 
23 you to Valley Mental Health and I'm going to require you a: a 
24 minimum to sign up for and complete their Anger Management 
25 Program. 
1 In short, no new violations of the law, 36 ~*c~z~s 
2 probation with AP&P, you're to report to them within f^ve 
3 ousiness days. You are to pay restitution in the amount of 
4 approximately $550 a month, interest will accrue on the 
5 judgment and so the sooner and the more that you pay, tne less 
6 expensive the cost will be over time for you but we will ce 
7 looking for those payments. You will be making those payments. 
8 Are those payments going to be coming to the court, are tney 
9 going to go to ORS, who are they going to go to? 
10 MR. HITTLE: Your Honor, OR has shown me they are 
11 seriously incompetent. I don't want to deal with them anymore. 
12 THE COURT: Normally in these kinds of matters, it _s 
13 ]ust handled by ORS, I'm just wondering if... 
14 MR. HITTLE: I'm objecting to dealing with them. 
15 I've been there many times and tried to get somebody to 
16 cooperate with me in the past years. I've written letters ana 
17 they've ignored me. I've asked them for a complete file, 
18 complete history of this case. I'll pick it up at the will 
19 call office, and I've never seen a paper. 
20 MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, perhaps to belay some of 
21 the concerns, payments, if Mr. Hittle would make the cneck o^t 
22 to ORS but then send it to our office, then we can expedite 
23 that. We can make sure that it was properly credited. Ms. 
24 Hepworth from our office, she monitors probation and is *or<i~g 
25 several cases and she's capable of doing that. 
1 THE COURT: All right. The alternative ccu.a ce ---.-
2 tney could be paid to the court and then the court coula t~e~ -
3 MR. HITTLE: I'm not going to take it to tne co.r:. 
4 THE COURT: If we did this would we have to have ~z 
5 cut to us and then we could cut another check? 
6 , MS. ?: (Inaudible) 
7 THE COURT: That's going to again delay. We nave to 
8 hold it how long? Fifteen working days? So that's going to 
9 create a real delay. 
10 MR. HITTLE: I would say this. It would not be a 
11 check it would be a money order or a cashier's check. 
12 MR. TORRENCE: Your Honor, if the Court were to oraer 
13 Mr. Hittle to make the payments, the money orders, to ORS and 
14 deliver them to ORS or the attorney general's office, Mr. 
15 Hittle could certainly make a photo copy of the front of tne 
16 money order or check before he sends it in then he could Keep 
17 track of exactly how much he has paid in case there's a 
13 question later on whether payments were made or not. 
19 THE COURT: Based on what I'm being told, and I was 
20 }ust offering how to do it, but if the policy of tne Third 
21 District is that we would have to hold it for 15 days, tnat _s 
22 ]ust going to create further delays and further problems, so I 
23 think that Mr. Torrence's suggestion is probably tne best is 
24 that you keep copies of what you are sending so that you nave 
25 independent documentation of what has been paid in payments t: 
1 ORS, but I will rather than have them go to ORS directly, I ar 
2 going to have them go to the attorney general's office. Have 
3 the money orders made out to ORS but to be sent to the AG's 
4 office - to Ms. Hepworth? 
5 MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, for the record, the 
6 Attorney General's Office is P. 0. Box 104814, Salt Lake City, 
7 Utah 84114-0814. 
8 THE COURT: All right, and that will be provided to 
9 Mr. Hittle. But it is always a good practice for you to 
10 retain, to make a photocopy and keep that record. 
11 MR. HITTLE: I've got pay check stubs from the 
12 withholding that the employers sent to ORS and they're still 
13 accusing me of not having paid it. 
14 THE COURT: Well, that's why I'm having it go to tne 
15 attorney general's office instead of directly to ORS. That 
16 then becomes another cross check of what you are, in fact, nave 
17 paid independent of what ORS may ascertain. 
18 MR. HITTLE: Fifteen days, they've waited how many 
19 years for this? What's 15 more days going to do? 
20 THE COURT: Well, it's the accumulative effect of 
21 delaying by another half a month again the payment that is 
22 owed, so the order will be that the money order will be maae to 
23 OR but will be sent to care of Ms. Hepworth at the attorney 
24 general's office. 
25 MR. TORRENCE: Your Honor, so we could reach 
1 determination on this cf a figure that is the orcer of tr.e 
2 Court, the final figure, could we set a review hearing m "is 
3 for perhaps a period of 45 days out so that after I receive t~e 
4 proposed figure from the attorney general's office, I will 
5 certainly get in contact with Mr. Hittle, we do have subpoenas 
6 out to some of past employers and the State Unemployment 
7 Compensation Office. So once we get together with that 
8 information, if we're not able to somehow agree to those 
9 figures of the AG's Office that might insure that we all get 
10 back together as some time. 
11 THE COURT: That makes sense. 
12 MR. TORRENCE: And the court can determine exactly 
13 what that (inaudible). 
14 THE COURT: How about Monday, June 12th? 
15 MR. TORRENCE: I'm sorry, what time was that? 
16 THE COURT: We can do it either 9:00 o'ciocx or 2:30 
17 o'clock or 1:30. 
18 MR. PETERSON: 1:30 would be better. 
19 THE COURT: All right. 1:30? 
20 MR. PETERSON: 1:30 Monday, June 12? 
21 THE COURT: Monday, June 12th. 
22 (Whereupon the hearing was concluded.) 
23 
24 
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